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Abstract
We study if urban class segregation destroys social capital in Latin America using
experimental data that are representative for six Latin American cities. In particular,
we focus on whether belonging to upper class neighborhoods impacts reciprocity
in a standard trust game. While our overall results confirm a negative association
between these two variables, we also find that trusting behavior can help counteract
the negative impact of class.
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Introduction
As a result of a combination of historical, institutional and economic reasons, many Latin
American cities today are highly segregated by class (Johnson, 1983). This is reflected by observed
urban patterns in which, at one extreme, upper class groups are spatially concentrated in very
limited zones of cities—typically near financial centers as well as very specific suburban areas. At
the other extreme, poor groups live mainly in more distant and badly serviced areas as well as in
the deteriorated sectors that are close to the city-center (Sabatini, 2003). Whereas people from
different neighborhoods do interact with each other in their everyday life, it is also common
knowledge to all residents that specific neighborhoods correspond to specific classes. On average,
class groups are very conscious of this fact and rarely socially mix. Individuals live alongside but
separately. 1 In fact, this urban segregation may impact social capital negatively. 2 Worryingly,
despite recent efforts to improve city integration (Jatiman, 2015), the current negative socioeconomic climate in the region, reflected in increased crime and exacerbated urban inequality, may
be further conducive to the destruction of social capital.3
In this research we study whether urban segregation is linked to social capital, and we focus
in particular on whether social class, measured by neighborhood of provenance, contributes to the
destruction of reciprocity or trustworthiness, a crucial element of social capital. Although some
researchers study this question (e.g., Glaeser et al., 2000), there is still no clarity on the possible
link between these two variables, an issue that is compounded by the fact that samples tend to be
small and not representative of any segment of the population, which may introduce bias in the

1

What defines social class in Latin America is a rather difficult question that researchers have tried to answer for a long time.
While the specifics depend on each city, overall it appears to be determined by a combination of race, income, family historical
background, and education (Angotti, 2013).
2 https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/11/the-missing-link-between-diversity-and-community/413875/
3 Latin America is home to ten of the fifteen most unequal cities in the world and 47 out 50 most deadly cities in the world
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/latin-america-s-cities-unequal-dangerous-and-fragile-but-that-can-change/
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results. Unlike previous research, we offer three specific contributions. First, we employ
representative data for six Latin American cities, a region that is somewhat underrepresented in
terms of experimental research. Second, the data come from an artefactual approach that applies a
standard “tried and true” trust game and helps us focus on our question of interest instead of design
issues of the experiment itself. Third, while we believe very relevant, the question under
investigation has hardly been addressed and less so using representative samples.
Our paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data, followed by a
description of the empirical methodology. The fourth section shows our findings. The final section
concludes.
Data
The data is from Cardenas et al. (2013), who performed several experimental games on the
field using representative samples for Bogota, Buenos Aires, Caracas, Lima, Montevideo and San
Jose. They collected stratified random samples where strata were chosen on the basis of education,
income, neighborhoods, gender and age. Our research focuses on the data produced out of their
first activity, a straightforward trust game (Cardenas et al., 2013). In this experiment, session
participants are randomly assigned in pairs, where one half of the individuals assume the role of
Player 1 and the other half of individuals, that of Player 2. Both groups are simultaneously located
in different rooms, and the identities of the pairs are never revealed, although each player receives
information on key demographic characteristics of their pairs: sex, age, schooling level, and socioeconomic stratum. In this game, both players receive an equal endowment, and Player 1 is then
asked to decide how much of this endowment he or she wants to send to Player 2, knowing that
Player 2 will then receive three times that amount on top of the initial endowment everyone initially
receives. In another room, Player 2 is asked to decide the amount to be returned to Player 1 for
2

each possible offer from Player 1, from a discrete set of fractions of amounts sent (0 percent, 25
percent, 50 percent, 75 percent and 100 percent). As Cardenas et al. (2013) explain, doing this
facilitates any comparisons among countries as each one has its own domestic currency.
Immediately before making their decisions, the individuals are also asked to predict the decisions
to be made by the other player. That is, the amount expected by Player 2 from Player 1, and Player
1’s expected returned amount from Player 2. After both players make their decisions, the matching
of their choices is made. This procedure allows us to separate the effects of expectations from
those of social background (Cardenas et al., 2013).4
Empirical Strategy
The reduced form employed is the following:
𝑹𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏 𝑼𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓𝑵𝒊 + 𝜷𝟐 (𝑼𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓𝑵𝒊 ) ∗ (𝑷𝟏 𝑶𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒊 ) + 𝜹𝑿𝒊 + 𝝋𝑷𝒊 + 𝜺𝒊
where 𝑹𝒆𝒄𝒊𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊 is defined by the return ratio (the percentage of the return as a fraction of
the final disposable endowment). In other words, this variable captures the amount that Player 2
returns to Player 1 after the latter makes his initial move in the trust game. 𝑼𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓𝑵𝒊 is a dummy
that takes the value of 1 if Player 2 belongs to an upper-class neighborhood, and 0 if this is not the
case. (𝑼𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒓𝑵𝒊 ) ∗ (𝑷𝟏 𝑶𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒓𝒊 ) , is the interaction between the amount sent by Player 1 and
̂ 𝟐 implies that participants
whether Player 2 comes from an upper class neighborhood. A positive 𝜷
tend to reciprocate proportionally, conditional on the amount offered by Player 1. In addition, 𝑿𝒊
represents a vector of control variables of individual i, which include sex, education, race, whether
the individual is employed, the degree of risk aversion of the individual, a positive offer in a

4

Cardenas, et al. (2013) also collected data from other experimental games, in particular, a voluntary contributions game and a risk
aversion game. We use the data of these additional artefactual experiments as controls in our reduced forms, as described in the
following section.
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voluntary contribution game, household size and whether the individual is the head of the
household. 𝑷𝒊 is a vector of control variables of individual i matched Player 1. Finally, 𝜺𝒊 is the
error term. All regressions include city and session fixed effects. In addition, in the all regressions
the errors are clustered at the city-session level. Table 1 provides definitions of all the variables
employed in this research.
Findings
Table 2 shows our results. In column 1 we provide evidence that individuals coming from
upper-class neighborhoods tend to reciprocate less, as the reciprocated amount from Player 2 to
Player 1 is reduced by around 6.6 percentage points with respect to the final endowment.
Segregation and urban inequality may have a negative bearing on social capital. Interestingly, this
result is countered by the fact that individuals are compelled to reciprocate larger amounts the
larger the initial offer of Player 1 is. That is, when Player 2 comes from an upper-class
neighborhood, we find that the more trusting Player 1 is, the more trustworthy Player 2 will be
and, thus, will reciprocate a larger amount. Having said this, the overall impact of belonging to an
upper-class neighborhood remains negative, on average.
The second column in Table 2 highlights the fact that when we control for the expected
offer of Player 1, we still find the same results as when this variable is not included, as both of our
variables of interest maintain their corresponding signs and remain statistically significant at
conventional levels, although, as expected, the size of the interacted coefficient drops from 0.11
to 0.08. Interestingly, we still find that when Player 2 comes from an upper-class neighborhood,
the original amount extended by Player 1 to Player 2 still motivates the latter to reciprocate
proportionally with respect to the size of originally sent to him or her.

4

Conclusions
We study if urban class segregation destroys social capital in Latin America. In order to do
this, we use experimental data that identifies upper class neighborhoods in six cities and focus on
whether reciprocity is negatively impacted in a standard trust game. While our overall results
confirm a negative association between class and reciprocity, we also find an important silver
lining. It appears that trusting behavior and goodwill can help counteract the negative impact of
class. Individuals from upper-class neighborhoods that are trusted appear to be willing to
reciprocate accordingly. This is potentially good news from a policy perspective, as governments
may want to consider mechanisms that make particularly salient issues related to goodwill and
consensus when designing public policy.
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Table 1. Variables
Variable
Obs.
Mean Std Dev
Min
Max
Return ratio
1,533
0.28
0.21
0
1
Upper Neighborhood
1,570
0.26
0.44
0
1
Player 1 Offer
1,545
0.45
0.28
0
1
Player1 Expected Offer
1,567
0.48
0.29
0
1
Player 2 Sex
1,574
0.55
0.5
0
1
Player 2 Age
1,571
36.99
14.48
17
77
Player 2 Secondary
1,574
0.23
0.42
0
1
Player 2 Higher Education
1,574
0.46
0.50
0
1
Player 2 Employment
1,574
0.7
0.46
0
1
Player 2 Caucasian
1,560
0.56
0.50
0
1
Player 2 Household Head
1,574
0.37
0.48
0
1
Player 2 Household Size
1,569
4.03
1.79
1
15
Player 2 Low Risk Aversion
1,573
0.18
0.38
0
1
Player 2 Mid Risk Aversion
1,573
0.29
0.45
0
1
Player 2 Part in Vol Cont Game
1,572
0.22
0.42
0
1
Player 1 Sex
1,556
0.56
0.50
0
1
Player 1 Upper Neighborhood
1,574
0.22
0.41
0
1
Player 1 Age
1,552
37.56
14.62
17
80
Player 1 Secondary
1,574
0.21
0.41
0
1
Player 1 Higher Education
1,574
0.49
0.50
0
1
Player 1 is the first mover in the trust game. Player 2, or second mover, is the
individual that reciprocates the amount initially offered by Player 1. All of these
variables were included in the regressions presented in Table 2.
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Table 2. Determinants of Reciprocity
(1)
(2)
Upper Neighborhood
-0.0665***
-0.0567**
(0.0254)
(0.0239)
Player 1 Offer
0.0128
0.0258
(0.0297)
(0.0279)
Upper Neighborhood *
Player 1 Offer
0.116**
0.0858**
(0.0473)
(0.0432)
Expected Player 1 Offer
0.212***
(0.0209)
Constant
0.0824
-0.0004
(0.0510)
(0.0494)
Observations
1,509
1,505
R-squared
0.210
0.279
Session FE
Yes
Yes
City FE
Yes
Yes
The dependent variable is the percentage of the final endowment returned by
Player 2 to Player 1. The final Player 2 endowment is composed as the sum of
the initial endowment of Player 2 and Player 1 offer multiplied by three. All
regressions include sex, age, education, race, employment dummy, degree of
(experimental) risk aversion, dummy for contributing in an (experimental)
voluntary contributions game, household head dummy and household size.
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